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Health Law
The Devil in the Tiers
Robin Feldman1
Introduction
Prescription-drug spending in the United States has soared in
the last decade. A critical mechanism for restraining drug
spending is the formulary system, which dictates whether, and the
extent to which, a health plan will reimburse for a drug.
Formularies, at the most basic level, are lists of medicines. Health
plans divide today’s formularies into tiers that determine how
much patients pay out-of-pocket. When drugs are on low tiers,
such as Tiers 1 and 2, patients pay less. When drugs are on high
tiers, such as Tiers 4 and 5, patients pay more.
Formularies typically allocate drugs to tiers based on the price
of the drug. Thus, lower-priced generic drugs are typically on the
lower tiers, while higher-priced brand-name and “specialty” drugs
are typically on higher tiers. In short, tiering encourages patients
to choose less expensive generics over more expensive brands. A
patient’s copay is less, the cost to the healthcare system overall is
less, and the market for cheaper drugs thrives. That is the concept
of tiering, at least in theory.
This chapter examines whether tiers are doing their jobs.
Based on a study of one million Medicare patients from 2010 to
2017, I find clear evidence of widespread improper tiering and
wasted spending.2 Specifically, cheaper generics are often placed
on high tiers, sometimes even higher than their brand competitors,
costing patients and the government billions of dollars. The
solution is to require tiering based on list price, rather than net
price. This simple, feasible solution will save costs, rationalize
tiering, and disincentivize rebate gaming.

1

Excerpted and adapted from Robin Feldman, The Devil in the Tiers,
8 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1 (2021). The research summarized in this chapter
was supported in part by a grant from the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation.
2
For further details on this study’s methodology, see id. at 43–58.
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Overview of Drug Pricing and Gaming
Price is a murky term in the prescription-drug world. A drug’s
actual, or net, price depends on rebates that are determined by
complex calculations established in long-term contracts. Middle
players called Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) establish the
supply contracts and the terms of prices and rebates by negotiating
with drug companies on behalf of health-insurance plans.3 The
health plans pay PBMs based on the size of the discount that the
PBM can wrest from the drug company, sometimes even allowing
the PBMs to pocket part of the spread.4 This method—called
spread pricing—should lead PBMs to negotiate more substantial
discounts, which would, in turn, lower net prices.
Perverse incentives and strategic behaviors, however, have
derailed the process. To increase the dollar flows to PBMs, drug
companies raise list prices for drugs and then offer larger rebates.
PBMs can then report a greater spread, thereby increasing their
pay, even if the final price the health plan pays after rebate remains
the same or even increases. This practice is akin to marking up the
price of a jacket before a sale so that the sale price looks more
appealing. The practice, however, creates upward pressure on
drug prices, as drug companies offer—and PBMs demand—
greater spreads. In other words, to keep the drug company’s
revenue the same, the net price must be the same. The only way
to do that and increase the spread is to increase the starting price.
At the same time, the drug companies and PBMs assert that
the rebates and net prices are trade secrets. Health plans, and even
their auditors, are not allowed to know them.5 Thus, for example,
a health plan will know what it pays for a particular patient’s heart
medication at the moment of the purchase (the list price), but the
plan will never know the true, net price because rebates on
numerous purchases will be lumped together and delivered long
after the patient leaves the pharmacy counter.

3

See Michael Hiltzik, How “Price-Cutting” Middlemen are Making
Crucial Drugs Vastly More Expensive, LA TIMES (2017).
4
Id.
5
Robin Feldman & Charles Tait Graves, Naked Price and
Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 61, 74
(2020).
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This price gaming might be less of a problem if no one
actually paid the higher list price. But many people do. Some
health plans require that patients pay the full list price for a drug
until reaching a deductible level or that patients pay a co-share
amount calculated as a percentage of the list price.6 Some patients
lack health insurance or lack plans that cover medications. Even
with full Medicare coverage, gaps can occur that leave patients
paying a drug’s full list price. And list prices are rising.
In exchange for the lucrative rebates that drive PBM
profitability, drug manufacturers can demand that the PBM
guarantee a certain volume flow from the health plan’s patients by
giving their drugs exclusive or preferred formulary placement.
These volume rebates allow drug companies that hold substantial
market power to secure favorable tier placement and prevent
competitors from gaining ground.7 In competition terms, this is a
form of raising rivals’ costs.8
The danger of volume rebates can be more pronounced in the
context of large drug manufacturers offering a variety of drugs. A
drug company offering multiple drugs can use its market
dominance in one drug to protect its less-competitive drug. Brand
drugs whose patents are expiring may hold monopoly positions
that allow for this type of volume-rebate behavior.9
Anecdotal evidence has hinted at abuses in the formulary
system, driven by the incentive structure in place and the type of
strategic behaviors described above. One lawsuit alleged that
health-insurance plans excluded a cheaper version of the arthritis

6

Norman Augustine, Guru Madhavan & Sharyl Nass, Making Medicines
Affordable: A National Imperative, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, &
MED. 76 (2018).
7
For an extensive examination of the rebate system and its effects on
competition, see ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET
HANDSHAKES: THE UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICES (2019).
8
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209 (1986); see also FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38 (comparing the
strategy of raising prices at the tail end of a monopoly period to “raising
rivals’ costs”).
9
See FELDMAN, supra note 7.
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drug Remicade, following bundled-rebate deals from the brand.10
Another alleged that a vaccine company significantly raised its
prices for any consumers that did not buy a the full range of its
bundled vaccines, in order to prevent customers from jumping
ship to a recently introduced competitor.11 Another alleged that a
company used bundled rebates and exclusive formulary contracts
to disadvantage competitors of the blockbuster dry-eye
medication Restasis.12
Are similar manipulations occurring throughout the system,
and can one see evidence of those manipulations in the drugpricing tiers themselves? The study summarized in this chapter
sets out to examine empirically whether evidence exists of
widespread irrational tiering and problems created by that
irrationality. The results confirm that the way drugs are currently
being placed on formulary tiers is troubling, adversely affecting
patients, and costing society.
Study Details and Results
To start, the price of brand drugs has risen at an astonishing
pace, even after rebates, as Figure 1 below shows. Between 2006
and 2017, the average dosage-unit price for brand drugs, after
rebates, increased 313%, from $38 to $157.13 Brand list prices rose
even more sharply. Between 2006 and 2017, the average dosageunit list price for brand drugs rose from $42 to $221, a 426%
increase. Both the amount and percentage increases for brand

10

Compl. at 1, Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 17-4180 (E.D.
Pa.).
11
Class Action Compl. at 3, Castro v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., No. 11-7178
(D.N.J.).
12
Compl. at 6, 21–23, Shire U.S., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. 17-7716
(D.N.J.) (alleging that according to one Medicare plan administrator,
the new competitor could give its drug away for free and the numbers
still wouldn’t work).
13
Drugs can be dispensed in different dosages, creating the need for a
method of normalizing dosages and prices across different drugs. To
solve this problem, the study uses a novel metric: the average dosageunit price.
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drugs contrast with the relatively stable $3–4 that plans pay for
generics (for which rebates are generally not given).14

Figure 1: Average dosage-unit price

As noted above, tiering should reflect a drug’s price, with
cheaper generics placed on lower, less-expensive tiers and
expensive brand drugs placed on higher, more-expensive tiers.
But generics are increasingly losing out. In 2010, 96% of generics
were placed on the two lower tiers (the most-favorable ones), but,
by 2017, the percentage was 66%. The percentage of generics on
the lowest tier decreased even more markedly, from 73% to 28%,
even though the cost to health plans for generics remained stable.
In contrast, the percentage of brand drugs on the lowest tier
remained relatively constant throughout this time. Thus, generics
specifically are being shifted away from the lowest tier.
Given that brand drugs are normally far more expensive than
their generic competitors, a generic should be on a lower tier than
a brand with the same active ingredient. Yet the study finds
troubling evidence of “irrational tiering,” in which a generic is
14

See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2011 MEDICARE
TRUSTEES REPORT 183. Despite the price stability of generic drugs, outof-pocket patient costs for generics rose 75% to roughly $7 per
prescription across the study period. Thus, patient expenditures for
generics are rising, while insurers pay roughly the same amount for
generics over time.
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placed on a tier equal to or higher than a brand with the same
active ingredient.15 In 2015, for example, 69% of generics
experienced at least one improper placement. The trend is
worsening over time. The percentage of generics with improper
tiering has risen from 47% in 2010 to 74% in 2017. The rising
incidence of irrational tiering corresponds with a drastic shrinking
of the percentage of generic drugs in the first tier and with a sharp
rise in the percentage of generic drugs in higher tiers.
To estimate the wasted cost of irrational tiering, the study
calculated the out-of-pocket amounts that patients actually paid
for individual drug purchases, combined with any amount that the
federal government paid for that purchase through its LowIncome Subsidy Program, and then compared that total with the
amounts that patients and the federal government would have paid
if generics irrationally tiered had instead been tiered one level
lower.16 The findings are staggering. In 2017 alone the amount of
wasted spending was $4.17 billion, an 83-fold increase over 2010.
The total wasted spending across the entire 2010–2017 study
period amounts to $13.25 billion.
Solutions
Tiering today is based on the net price, which is the bottomline cost to the insurer. But the net price is subject to rebate
gaming. If tiers were based on list price, drug companies that
raised prices to give space for rebates and other payments to PBMs
would find that the strategy backfires. The high list price would
drive the company’s product to a higher tier, making it
unattractive in comparison to cheaper substitutes.
List-price tiering would also be more transparent. PBMs have
aggressively claimed that net-pricing information constitutes a
trade secret. List prices have no claim to secrecy. Medicare
regulations already require drug companies to report the list price,
including providing penalties for failure to report.

15

For information on the study’s parameters, see Feldman, supra note 1,
at 19–20.
16
Rationalizing tiering by lowering the generic by just one level is highly
conservative; accurate tier placement would be far lower in cases of large
price differential.
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A regulatory path for list-price tiering exists today. The Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) could choose to
require list-price tiering, in accordance with its mandate of
providing high-quality, cost-effective drug benefits. Similarly,
given that CMS already reviews and provides guidance on
formularies, Congress could easily grant any additional authority
necessary to further regulate formularies and require list-price
tiering. Given that instituting such a broad change for the private,
health-insurance industry could be practically challenging and
politically daunting,17 moving tiering to list prices could begin
with the Medicare system, with the potential to create ripple
effects in the private-insurance market.18
Conclusion
No single solution can possibly solve all problems within the
formulary system, let alone with pharmaceutical pricing. This
study and its recommendations presuppose a smoothly
functioning generics market. If other strategic behaviors block or
hinder that market,19 all the formulary reform in the world will not
help. Nevertheless, abuses of the formulary system have cost
patients and the government over $13 billion from 2010–2017,
with the problem growing across time. Tiering can play a critical
role in driving patient behavior, but the devil is in the tiers. By
reforming legislative or regulatory rules to require that tiers reflect
list price, government officials can restore proper incentives in the

17

See David Brady & Daniel Kessler, Why is Health Reform so
Difficult?, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 161 (2010).
18
For factors that potentially limit the ability to project the study’s
findings onto the private-insurance market, see Feldman, supra, note 1,
at 28–30.
19
See Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 OXFORD
J. L. & BIOSCI. 590 (2018) (examining extent of patent evergreening and
its anticompetitive effects); Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of
Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 39 (2017) (exploring abuse of citizen petition process by
drug companies to delay approval of generic competitors); Robin
Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18
CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 101 (investigating use of pay-for-delay
tactics to stifle competition).
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drug-coverage system, with the happy side effect of discouraging
anticompetitive rebate and kickback schemes.
*

*

*

